

THE FUTURE OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION:  
CREATING STABILTY IN EASTERN EUROPE

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# CHAPTER 1

## INTRODUCTION

"The Cold War is over and peace is breaking out everywhere." This statement was made in jest by a retired German officer late in 1994. Unfortunately, the jest is a far cry from reality. My friend knew this as he pondered the world that his children would grow up in. Peace is not breaking out everywhere, in fact, the word of the day is instability. There is instability in regions all over the globe; North Africa, Southeast Asia, Central Asia, Central and South America, and Eastern and Central Europe. The idealistic hope of world peace that would be brought about by the end of the Cold War is, sadly, far from being a reality, or even a realistic dream.

The situation that now confronts the world is a demanding one indeed. The world powers were very efficient at fighting the Cold War. The tense *détente* was enough to keep conflict at a minimum; however, the world was far from safe. Now the world has to play a new game with completely new rules. What Czech President Vaclav Havel said may be true: "Many a Western politician may occasionally wonder, whether... the West should not have done more to prolong the existence of communism. After all, the world used to be so simple..."<sup>1</sup> Of course, this is an irrelevant postulation as the Cold War is over and the residual and existing Cold War structures need to be re-designed and re-oriented to play in this new game. These structures are still the best institutions available for playing this new game, subsequently, they should not be abolished or marginalized. They just need to be converted to play a new role by new rules.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization is a prime example of this. Many politicians, diplomats and peace organizations are clamoring for the dismantling of this Cold War relic. In an article written by former Soviet Premier Mikhail Gorbachev, he said that to re-vitalize NATO

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<sup>1</sup> Vaclav Havel, "A Call for Sacrifice," Foreign Affairs 73.2 (1994): 5 & 7.

was an attempt that, "instead of helping to resolve the issues, could rather lead into a dead end and give rise to relapses of suspicion and tensions."<sup>2</sup> This opinion can only presume that the rules must always remain the same - this is not true.

The rules must be re-written to reflect the changes that the world is facing. In order to make an accurate rules change, one must first make an accurate assessment of exactly what the new game is. To understand the new game, several questions must be asked. First, what are the characteristics of the present situation? Second, what are the security risks of this new situation? Third, what are the options for alleviating these risks? Finally, how can these options be utilized?

These questions are the bases of this paper. As of yet, many of the suggestions presented here are being tried in various capacities in order to actually find a workable solution. The task is monumental indeed, but out of monumental issues can be brought dramatic change for the world, for the better, or, for the worse.

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<sup>2</sup> Mikhail S. Gorbachev, "At the Threshold of the 21st Century," Security Dialogue 25 (1994): 253.

## CHAPTER 2

### WHAT WAS NATO?

NATO was born out of a need "to keep the Russians out; the Americans in; the Germans down."<sup>1</sup> Looking back to the 1950s, the Cold War was just heating up. McCarthyism was plaguing the United States and Communism was the horrid offspring of the Red Bear. NATO was built to provide Western Europe with some breathing room under a security umbrella so that it could re-build itself in the aftermath of World War II. Through NATO, the United States could provide a conventional and nuclear umbrella to protect European democracies which, in the face of the Soviet Union, had little hope of protecting themselves.

On April 4, 1949, the North Atlantic Treaty was signed in Washington by 12 North Atlantic states: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom, and the United States. By 1952 Greece and Turkey were members, followed by West Germany in 1954, and Spain in 1982. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization was created to "prevent aggression or to repel it, should it occur."<sup>2</sup>

In the first thirty years of NATO, Europe depended heavily on the partnership between the British and Americans and their nuclear power. However, that proved to be a bit tenuous as the rest of the free world grew more and more uneasy of this relationship. Even the United States became unsatisfied with the idea of being the chief protector of the free world. This change in demeanor was due in large part to increasing conflict in Korea in the early to mid-1950s. The United States would become increasingly insistent that Europe shoulder more of her own defense burden as the conflict in Vietnam would prove to be an impossible quagmire. This nuclear

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<sup>1</sup> Quoted by James O. Jackson, "Doubts About a NATO Jr.," Time International 3 October 1994: 30.

<sup>2</sup>NATO Information Service, The North Atlantic treaty Organization, Facts and Figures (Brussels; NATO, 1989) 13.

guarantee was not something that allowed the *protected* free world to sleep easier at night. After all, would the United States, safe on the other side of the Atlantic, risk nuclear war if Russia became imperialistic? Also, considering the close relationship that had developed between the two, early-50s, nuclear powers of Britain and the US, would North America or the British Isles take such a risk for the continent.<sup>3</sup> The US policy to install Thor IRBMs on the British Isles first was intended to "instill confidence in the alliance and facilitate deployment on the European continent."<sup>4</sup> Unfortunately, US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles was not accurate on this assumption. The tight relationship between the US and Britain was perceived as preferential. In that light, "it should have come as no surprise, therefore, that the Europeans questioned the assumption that US and British nuclear weapons guaranteed 'the defense of the free world'."<sup>5</sup>

After the launching of Sputnik, the strategic defense concept relied on the placement of IRBMs in Europe, the development of ICBMs, and the stockpiling of nuclear weapons. Before 1962 the US or Britain reserved the right to use their weapons, based on local and foreign soil, at their discretion. In 1962 with the Athens Guidelines, they both agreed to consult with NATO on the possibility of using their nuclear weapons. In 1963, the nuclear forces under the command of the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) were strengthened by the addition of a UK bomber force and three US Polaris-class submarines.

By the mid-sixties, this would not be enough as the Soviets had developed their own ICBMs. Under this new pressure, the Allies converted to the Second-Strike Capability or the Mutually Assured Destruction policy based on US Secretary of State Dulles' Massive Retaliation policy. Since then, the Powers have had the power to annihilate life on earth.

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<sup>3</sup> This places into perspective that by December 1957, the first Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) had been successfully tested. Previously, the major threats were Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missals (IRBMs) which were not in place to strike the United States, and would remain that way until after the Cuban Missile Crisis.

<sup>4</sup> Jan Melissen, "Nuclearizing NATO, 1957-1959: the 'Anglo-Saxons', nuclear sharing and the fourth country problem," Review of International Studies 20 (1994): 259.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid., 254.

In 1967, NATO specified its policy by revising it in the concept of Flexible Response. This policy would establish a balance of both nuclear and conventional forces that would be sufficient enough to "deter aggression and, should that deterrence fail, be capable of direct defense, including escalation... to the level of response necessary to convince the aggressor of the defender's determination and ability to resist, thus persuading him to cease the attack and withdraw." Furthermore, "An aggressor must therefore be convinced of NATO's readiness to use nuclear weapons if necessary, while uncertain as to the precise circumstances in which they would be used."<sup>6</sup>

The concept of nuclear deterrence held its place until the end of the Cold War. Even as late as 1990, Margaret Thatcher stated, "Strong sensible people like ourselves should keep them (nuclear weapons) in order to deter others from using them. If we cannot stop them from getting them, let's make sure we restrain them."<sup>7</sup> By this point, the Cold War was thawing and Ms. Thatcher was in Moscow to remind the Powers that just because tensions were easing between them, other states were wanting to arm.

The Cold War did thaw and Ms. Thatcher proved to be a bit of a visionary in her prediction of future conflicts. What these conflicts would exactly entail, no one could have guessed.

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<sup>6</sup> NATO Information Service, 216.

<sup>7</sup> Stuart Croft, "Continuity and Change in British Thinking about Nuclear Weapons," Political Studies 42 (1994): 240.

## CHAPTER 3

### WHAT IS THE CURRENT SITUATION?

The current situation can be summed up in two words: chaos and transition. With regards to Eastern and Central Europe, this has twice been the recipe for disaster in the last century alone.<sup>1</sup> The West is not sure what to do, the East is becoming embroiled in various conflicts, Russia faces internal strife as well as the concern that the West may be encroaching, Asia is a question with regard to China and the two Koreas, the Fertile Crescent is being mobbed by fundamentalism opposing the attempts at peace and the Gulf Region is a smoldering fire that constantly tries to re-ignite itself. For the purposes of this paper, I will discuss the situations in the East within an expanded NATO arena.

#### *Eastern Europe*

December 1991 was a month that changed the world. The Cold War was over, the Soviet Union had dissolved, democracies were taking root, and peace was breaking out everywhere. On the 8th of that month, Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine signed the agreement establishing the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). On the 21st of December, the Republics of Azerbaijan, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russian Federation, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Ukraine met in Alma Ata where the CIS issued a declaration "Recognizing and respecting each other's territorial integrity and the inviolability of existing borders," as well as a recognition "of and respect for State sovereignty and sovereign equality..."<sup>2</sup> The world rejoiced as democracy had prevailed over communism.

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<sup>1</sup> Henceforth, the terms Eastern and Central Europe will be defined as Eastern Europe or the East referring to that region that encompasses the former Warsaw Pact states in the Balkans, Caucasia, the Baltic states, including Russia.

<sup>2</sup> Marilou M. Righini, ed. "Alma Ata Declaration of the Commonwealth of Independent States" International Legal Material 31 (1992): 148.

The party did not last as long as anticipated. When the Soviet Union disintegrated, no constant force was left to maintain peace. For that matter, these new countries had also lost their external security blanket: they were left on their own. The vacuum that developed led to ethnic rivalries and competitions for political and military control. The world quickly realized that a major problem was going to result from the fight for control between militarily weak states was a clear toss-up resulting in extreme suffering on the part of all participating parties. A primary example is Bosnia: "As Bosnia has recently learnt (sic) to its cost, militarily weak states or groups, no matter the level of their public support, are defenseless in the face of stronger and more ruthless neighbors."<sup>3</sup>

Bosnia is not the only hotspot to be worried about. In June 1991, Yugoslavia splintered into disputed regions fought for by the republics of Slovenia and Croatia against the Serb-dominated Yugoslav army. 1992 saw war start in Bosnia-Herzegovina (a war that has yet to end) as well as civil war in the Caucus state of Georgia. Civil war is still raging in Azerbaijan and Armenia over control of the Nagorno-Karabakh region. Regional sparks have occurred in Moldova and Tajikistan to add further instability, not to mention, the political disarray that afflicts Russia.<sup>4</sup>

On this new stage, the actors are not as predictable as they were during the Cold War. Here, diplomacy has less effect and the only peace seems to come about through the barrel of a gun. Western policy-makers and strategists feel that the only way to bring about peace and stability is through the promotion of democratic processes. Unfortunately, in war-zones, the only vote that counts is the vote cast by the victor. In the less volatile regions, however, democracy may be seen as a good policy of insurance. However, where the regions are more stable internally, they are gravely concerned for their external security, and rightly so. Bulgaria,

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<sup>3</sup> Malcolm Chalmers, "Developing a Security Regime for Eastern Europe," Journal of Peace Research 30 (1994): 428.

<sup>4</sup> The Yugoslav states, Georgia, or Bosnia were not a party to the initial ratification of the CIS document.

the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Romania, and the Baltics (Estonia, Kaliningrad, Latvia, and Lithuania) are showing attempts, if not realities, at working democracies. Nevertheless, they are in the undesirable position of being between a rock and a hard place. To their east lay the nuclear powers of Russia and Ukraine. The dust has barely settled on Russia's trail home and these countries are not particularly comfortable with the prospect that Russia may tread back to the west. Internally, they face problems of ethnic and economic root that could destroy democracy.

In a speech to an assembly of Russian ambassadors, Russian Foreign Minister, Andrei Kozyrev stated in January 1994, "We should not withdraw from those regions that have been in the sphere of Russian influence for centuries."<sup>5</sup> This opinion is a vague reality as Russian troops have been involved in Tajikistan, Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Moldova. Russia has yet to fully relinquish her claims on the Eastern areas.

The Ukraine, in its own right, has serious concerns. It still holds leftover nuclear weapons left by the Soviet Union. Now, Russia wants these back, as well as the full control of the Black Sea Fleet. The new Ukrainian government is not sure how much it wants to give up its nuclear status. The Ukraine's desire to be an independent nuclear state can be seen in its failure to ratify the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks treaty (START) in December of 1993.<sup>6</sup> In the internal aspect, "Mafia gangs are the focus of awe and aspiration of Ukraine's young."<sup>7</sup> This is just a statement referring to Ukraine, however, the sentiment is spread from Vladivostok to Warsaw. Crime is rampant and for the Ukraine, pride implies the desire to do anything to re-gain international recognition; for now, that means keeping all her nuclear capabilities.

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<sup>5</sup> Martin Walker, "Russia and the West: What Is to Be Done Now," World Policy Journal 11 (1994): 2.

<sup>6</sup> However, at the 5 December 1994 Heads-of-State summit of the CSCE, Ukraine formally acceded to the START Treaty

<sup>7</sup> Christopher Pett and Vyacheslav Pikhovshec, "Transformation of the Ukrainian armed forces," NATO Review October 1994: 24.

The situation has placed the East in a very tenuous position that requires the help of the Western World, specifically NATO. The Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia have each issued their desire to become full members of NATO. They have expressed their desire to become members of the European Union (EU) and all of its subsequent parts. These countries have one major reason for this request: "an almost desperate search for security."<sup>8</sup> With security guarantees, these countries can, more efficiently, smooth out the rough spots of internal conflict as to build their economies, restore their environments, and become full partners in European co-operation.

The Ukraine, however, has not made any specific motions to its desires to join NATO. A NATO official has stated that "In the past... previous governments [have stated] yes to [enter] NATO. In the current government it is not so clear."<sup>9</sup> It would seem that Ukraine wants to maintain all of the independence that she can. However, such a cavalier attitude may very well be asking for trouble from either an outside group or from Russia herself.

As far as the turbulent regions, they want peace, however, they are not sure whose peace they want. Bosnia will not respond to United Nations negotiations, former Yugoslavia is only being held at bay by NATO war-planes, Georgia is dependent on Russian forces to keep the government of Eduard Shevardnadze in place, the same also holds true for Azerbaijan, Russian troops are still camped out in Estonia, Latvia and Moldova. Only outside pressure can ensure that true democratic processes will take place in these countries.<sup>10</sup>

## **NATO**

*Security is indivisible and the security of every participating State is inseparably linked to that of all of us.*

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<sup>8</sup> Ronald D. Asmus, Richard L. Kugler and F. Stephen Larrabee, "Building a New NATO," Foreign Affairs (September/October 1993): 29.

<sup>9</sup> Lecture given by George Katsirdakis of the Greek delegation, a member of Defense, Planning and Policy Division at NATO HQ, Brussels, 3 November 1994.

<sup>10</sup> Walker, 2.

- "Charter of Paris", November 1990

*NATO's purpose remains what is(sic) has been from the beginning - to guarantee the security of its members, something which it has done better than any alliance in history... Our purpose today is equally to extend these same blessings to the people of Central and Eastern Europe.*

- Willy Claes, Secretary General of NATO, October, 1994

Recently selected NATO Secretary General Willy Claes spoke to the 40th General Assembly of the Atlantic Treaty Association at The Hague; there he clearly summed up NATO's position concerning the developments in the East: "[NATO must focus on] working with our Central and East European partners to develop a co-operative approach to security and indeed a widening of the Western security community."<sup>11</sup> It is fairly clear what NATO wants to do.

Currently, NATO forces are, for the first time in its history, being used for UN sponsored peacekeeping endeavors. In former Yugoslavia, NATO forces are involved in UNPROFORII and in the Adriatic, NATO naval forces are involved in *Operation Sharp Guard* where they "monitor shipping and economic sanctions imposed by the UN on Serbia and Montenegro and the arms embargo on the whole of the former Yugoslavia."<sup>12</sup>

NATO is getting involved. For the first time, NATO has gone out-of-area at the request of the UN. NATO is actively looking at ways to incorporate some of these states into their structure. It has recently developed several plans to further this process. Among these are the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) established first in 1975 by the Helsinki Final Act, The North Atlantic Co-operation Council (NACC) created in 1991 at the summit of the Heads of Government of the NATO Allies in Rome, and most recently, the Partnership for Peace (PFP) established at the January 1994 summit of NATO.

NATO has changed its defense policy from Flexible Response to Crisis Management. In the words of a NATO official, "If we don't have a specific enemy... we must now develop a co-

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<sup>11</sup> Address by Willy Claes, Secretary General of NATO at The 40th General Assembly of the Atlantic Treaty Association, The Hague, The Netherlands, 28 October 1994.

<sup>12</sup> The International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 1993-1994, (London: Brassey's, 1994) 15 & 30.

operative process in maintaining security... [and that is] Crisis Management."<sup>13</sup> For those who declare that NATO has served its purpose, they must now take into account that the purpose of NATO has changed. The old NATO is gone and the North Atlantic area is witnessing the birth of a new NATO, no longer a Cold War machine, but a peace keeper and crisis manager. In the invitation to all states of the East to join the PFP, NATO declares that:

The Partnership will expand and intensify political and military co-operation throughout Europe, increase stability, diminish threats to peace, and build strengthened relationships by promoting the spirit of practical co-operation and commitment to democratic principles that underpin our Alliance.<sup>14</sup>

NATO is the only institution with the strength and the respect to bring security and the peace that follows to this volatile region. The United States also plays a large part in these affairs. In recent years, the US has made overtures that it should lower its influence within NATO. This may be the result of a practical examination of purely fiscal measures surveyed in the light of the end of the Cold War. Europe, East and West, cannot afford that. The Pentagon does not want to get involved in what has been termed as a renewed German *Drang nach Osten*.<sup>15</sup> However, the US needs to be involved primarily to maintain the trans-Atlantic nature of the inclusion of the East into NATO. Failure to have US involvement could agitate Russian fears that the move of expansion is a German notion. Easing Russian fears will be hard enough as it is, by keeping the United States involved, it at least resolves one problem, however, it leads to the problem of perceived American imperialism.

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<sup>13</sup> Attributed to George Katsirdakis, see note #8.

<sup>14</sup> Partnership for Peace invitation issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council held at NATO HQ, Brussels on 10-11 January 1994.

<sup>15</sup> A major proponent in favor of quickly expanding NATO membership to the Visegrad republics is German Defense Minister Volker Ruehe.

Frederick Kempe, "The Answer to Europe's German Question," The Wall Street Journal Europe 16-17 Sept. 1994, weekend ed., sec. 1: 8.

To illustrate the nervousness that NATO has towards the US resulting from massive force cutbacks of US force commitments to NATO from 320,000 troops in 1990 to about 100,000 in 1994, Secretary General Claes stated, "First and foremost, our task over the next few years is to ensure that the transatlantic link between Europe and North America continues to flourish... I see the transatlantic link as basic to our hopes of further developing the construction of Europe."<sup>16</sup> Other leaders have maintained that US involvement is imperative to any NATO action. Most notably, Margaret Thatcher stated in a speech in Bruges on the future of Europe, "We must strive to maintain the US commitment to Europe's defense Let us...[look] outward not inward ... [to preserve] that Atlantic Community - that Europe on both sides of the Atlantic..."<sup>17</sup>

In conclusion, NATO wants to maintain the transatlantic link between it and the US, and NATO wants desperately to become involved in the security of the East as an effort to provide stability and ensure democracy.

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<sup>16</sup> Data from "Partners for What?," The Economist 24 Sept. 1994:30.

Quote from Address by Willy Claes.

<sup>17</sup> Margaret Thatcher, "Heirs to Europe," The Guardian 21 Nov. 1988, edited speech.

The full text reads "We must strive to maintain the US commitment to Europe's defense. Let us have a Europe which plays its full part in the wider world, which looks outward not inward, and which preserves that Atlantic Community - that Europe on both sides of the Atlantic - which is our greatest inheritance and our greatest strength."

## CHAPTER 4

### WHAT ARE THE SECURITY RISKS?

It is abundantly clear that the East is facing many problems. Chief among these is instability and insecurity. To discuss security risks, one must take into account the internal pressures, the external pressures, and the overall concerns. In the East today, there are plenty from which to choose.

#### *Internal Pressures*

Among the Visegrad countries, internal pressures are at a minimum, or at least a relative minimum. The Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia all have working democracies and relatively stable economies. The Czech Republic has stabilized a 1991 GDP decline of 14% to an estimated 1992 decline of 8%; inflation, 57% in 1991, was, in 1992, down to 12.3%. Hungary's GDP growth in 1991 was -10%, in 1992 it was only -5%; inflation in 1991 was 35% and in 1992 down to 23%. Poland's GDP growth rate in 1991 was -18%, in 1992 it broke even at 0%; inflation in 1991 was 70.3%, in 1992 down to 43%. Finally, in Slovakia the growth rates are identical to the Czech Republic and inflation was down from 57% in 1991 to 39.8% in 1992. All of these countries are improving their economies and their rates of inflation are slowly stabilizing, reflecting a relative stable internal situation.<sup>1</sup>

In the Baltic states, the Russian army looms very close and their economies are far from stable.<sup>2</sup> Without a stable economy, the governments are facing dire times. Without prosperity, rarely comes peace. In the Balkans the situation is more serious. No one is even worried about the economy as Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro, and Macedonia are

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<sup>1</sup> The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 78, 81, 84, and 87.

<sup>2</sup> Their average inflation rates have risen from 153% in 1991 to 1,080% according to IISS, 78, 82-83.

either being torn apart by war or in disputes over borders. This region is a powder keg waiting to explode.

The Caucasus is much the same. Georgia is fragmented by civil war, Armenia and Azerbaijan are battling over Nagorno-Karabakh, and Russian troops are present everywhere. These countries are also too war-torn to worry about economics. Their chief internal risk is war.

The Ukraine has a substantial quantity of nuclear weapons that it wants to keep, that Russia wants back, and that the West wants destroyed. This country certainly qualifies as a country with internal security threats. This is before throwing in the issue of the Black Sea Fleet which has almost resulted in a confrontation.<sup>3</sup> Even without the confrontation with Russia, Ukraine's inflation rose from 84.3% in 1991 to 1,830% in 1992. The GDP of Ukraine has fallen from \$137.65 billion in 1991 to an estimated \$112.9 billion in 1992. The exchange rate of the Karbovanet to the dollar in 1991 was \$1=1.70 kar.; in 1992 it was \$1=180 kar.; and in 1993 it was estimated at \$1=3,500+ kar. These kinds of pressures are the kinds that could make the Ukraine a tinder-box with some mighty strong tender, in the form of 166 ICBMs and 62 nuclear-capable bombers.<sup>4</sup>

### ***External Threats***

Chief external threat: Russia.

Russian troops are still in the Caucasus and Baltics. The Visegrads are increasingly nervous about the claims of right-wing, ultra-nationalist Vladimir Zhirinovsky. For that matter the Pentagon is worried about him too.<sup>5</sup> In the words of an anonymous NATO official, "The internal situation [in Russia] is not predictable...[Zhirinovsky] doesn't stand a real chance to win the [presidential] elections...[but] his presence affects Russian foreign policy." Russia could

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<sup>3</sup> Pikhovshec and Pett, 21-25.

<sup>4</sup> IISS, pgs. 90-91.

<sup>5</sup> Kempe, sec. 1: 8.

become imperialistic again, the odds are that it will not, but when the threat is there and presents a clear danger; security must be provided.

### *Other Threats*

The nuclear issue must always be addressed. The Ukrainian situation is enough to classify it as an obvious other threat. With the internal situation so poor in the Ukraine, it is not inconceivable for her to play her military hand in an imperialistic drive. Western countries have done it before. For example, when Great Britain was facing a third place rank at the end of the 19th Century, chiefly due to increased competition posed by the US and Germany, she expanded her territory in an attempt to expand her markets.

Ethnic tensions in this entire region have been plaguing these areas since the break-up. With 20.3% Russian population in the Ukraine and other various minority groups spread out through the republics, more ethnic cleansing may be ahead. Ethnic cleansing is one of the horrors of the Bosnian conflict as well as the Yugoslav and Azerbaijani conflicts.

The economies of these countries have to be improved. Their currencies must be stabilized, and their growth rates must at least become positive. Without relatively stable economies based more on modern industry and less on agriculture and out-of-date, non-exportable industry, the situation will continue to remain volatile.

Another threat is the growing sense of complacency and lack of commitment by the West. In the words of Czech President Vaclav Havel:

If we... appeal to the West not to close itself off to us... then it is not because we are concerned about our own security and stability, and not only because we feel that the security of the world is at stake... we are concerned about the destiny of values and principles that communism denied, and in whose name we resisted communism and ultimately brought it down.<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> Havel, 4.

There is a growing concern that the West may be forsaking itself. This is a very viable concern; it can be evidenced in the failure of the West to end the Bosnian conflict, the Yugoslav conflict and other devastating conflicts.

Finally, the threat of a horrible environment must be placed into the equation. The results of forty years of abuse have left the resource value of the land virtually zero and the condition of life reduced to a dirty, polluted existence.

These are the threats at which NATO is looking. These are the threats that NATO wants to help alleviate. By providing various levels of guarantees and co-operative agreements, NATO expects to absolve some of these threats and to help these countries remedy other situations.

## CHAPTER 5

### WHAT ARE THE OPTIONS?

*The very possibility of a new world order and its effectiveness depends on the principles that would underlie it and on how its mechanisms would be run. A new world order assumes the ability to manage world processes in a rational way, taking into account the national state interests of all countries in a world that constitutes one single, interdependent integral.*

- Mikhail S. Gorbachev

The world is, without a doubt, at a cross-roads. The direction that it takes will determine the course of human events for a long time into the future. After the questions are understood, then can we search together for the solutions. There are many options from which to choose. Included among those options are the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), the North Atlantic Co-operation Council (NACC), the Partnership for Peace (PFP), the Western European Union (WEU) and a new definition of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Somewhere among these existing organizations lies the answer, or at least an answer. We can only look.

#### ***Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE)***

The CSCE was founded in Helsinki on August 1, 1975 with the specific intent to ensure "conditions in which their people can live in true and lasting peace free from any threat to or attempt against their security."<sup>1</sup> In its first agreement, the Helsinki Final Act, it specified areas of co-operation among thirty-five countries from Vancouver to Vladivostok. The Act has now spread to agreements between fifty-two member states. The areas of professed co-operation

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<sup>1</sup> Marilou M. Righini, ed., "The Helsinki Final Act," International Legal Material (1975):1293.

included respect for territorial integrity, refraining from the use of force, peaceful settlement of disputes, non-intervention in internal affairs, co-operation in security, co-operation in science and technology, etc. This was a non-legal agreement that served as a tenuous first step to East-West co-operation that is being relied on heavily now as a structure to facilitate the goals previously agreed to.<sup>2</sup>

At the Helsinki Summit, concluded on July 10, 1992, the CSCE declared to uphold the 1990 Charter of Paris, and "to meet new challenges we are approving here today a programme (sic) to enhance our capabilities for concerted action and to intensify our co-operation for democracy, prosperity and equal rights of security."<sup>3</sup> The CSCE wants to be a part of a new relationship that is free to develop between the East and the West. In section 10 of the Preamble, the Conference declared that NATO is increasing its role in this endeavor by establishing the NACC "in harmony with the goals of the CSCE."<sup>4</sup> In section 15 of the same preamble, it calls on all the signatories to remove all foreign troops from the Baltic states. This is one way to alleviate some of the security risks on that area. If followed, it could lead to more concentration on internal affairs, and with the economic aspects of the declaration, could lead to a productive economic partner that could eventually lead to membership into the EEC.

The CSCE reserves the right to conduct its own peace-keeping operations within the guidelines of the UN. In this endeavor, it could be effectively used, not as a foreign or a Russian force, but as a home force in the Balkans to more actively bring peace to that war-torn region. By using CSCE forces under the supervision of the UN, it does not bring with it the conflict of using NATO forces in the East, something that should ease Russian fears. Also, by not using predominately Russian forces, as would be the most likely case through the CIS, it would not have the appearance of Russian imperialism.

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<sup>2</sup>Ibid., 1293-1299.

<sup>3</sup> Marilou M. Righini, ed., "Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe: Declarations and Decisions from the Helsinki Summit," International Legal Material 31 (1992): 1390.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid., 1390.

Since the CSCE has incorporated NATO, EU, and former Warsaw Pact countries, there is no one side against the other. Within the oversight of the United Nations, and through effective, trans-national co-operation, the CSCE could be used, causing the least amount of tension possible, to establish a workable peace keeping arrangement.

One drawback is that the CSCE is not authorized, as of yet, to use "military action in defence of existing international borders... [and] CSCE policy specifically rules out the use of its peace-keeping forces in enforcement operations."<sup>5</sup> The CSCE already has legitimate support from the UN, WEU, and NATO. Throughout the framework document of the Partnership for Peace, NATO members are committed to support the CSCE and all of its objectives.<sup>6</sup> Once the legal apparatus have been decided, the CSCE can be made a very strong and effective tool. That can only be achieved through NATO. However, the sheer size of the 52-nation organization makes impossible to act on its own. The CSCE can be used by NATO to achieve the goals it laid out in the Charter of Paris and the Helsinki Summit in the ways previously stated. The CSCE can only be a leg of the whole; alone, it is impotent.

### ***The North Atlantic Co-operation Council (NACC)***

In 1991 the NACC was established as a "multilateral framework for co-operation and consultation within the countries of the former Warsaw Pact."<sup>7</sup> It was intended to be vague in design as to give it room to grow and expand as needed to increase East-West relations. As a precursor to the current Partnership for Peace, it served as a forum for members of the NACC to request for full NATO membership as soon as possible. All 38 members of the NACC are also members of CSCE, 23 are members of the PFP and 12 are members of the EU.

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<sup>5</sup> Chalmers, 438.

<sup>6</sup> "Partnership for Peace Framework Document" [NATO Archives](#) Brussels, Jan. 1994 secs. 2, 3, and 6.

<sup>7</sup> Statement made by a NATO press secretary about the NACC on 03 Nov. 1994 at NATO HQ in Brussels.

The NACC was not created as a step towards membership into NATO, EC, or the WEU however. The requests of those to enter NATO then were denied.

According to NATO, "The NACC is a forum for dialogue and consultation on political and security related issues and for partnership in practical co-operation activities, in areas of NATO competence, as agreed among the NACC members."<sup>8</sup> The NACC is a proper and positive forum for consultation on these matters, but it has no way to use military or economic measures to gain compliance with any matters. The NACC is not useful in removing any security threats, internal, external or other. If the NACC were to recommend measures to preserve peace in Bosnia, for instance, NATO could agree to use its resources to complete the job, however, the UN would have to authorize it and such a move would be no different than the current situation. There would be no way of incorporating the East into providing its own security.

NACC is a positive endeavor in that it allows for increased communication, unfortunately, it seems to be a repeat of the CSCE, only on a smaller scale.

### ***The Partnership for Peace (PFP)***

"The Partnership is our premier instrument for building closer relationships between Allies and the new democracies. Together, we will develop common ideas and approaches for peace keeping and humanitarian support operations to which those forces may be assigned..." This statement was made by NATO Secretary General Willy Claes in his 28 October 1994 speech to the NATO General Assembly. It clearly defines the importance that NATO is giving to the PFP as a tool to facilitate the end of Cold War mistrust and an increase in Eastern Security. Looking at the PFP Framework document, in Article 2, one can see the clear goal of this new program, established at NATO Headquarters in Brussels on 10-11 January, 1994:

This Partnership is established as an expression of a joint conviction that stability and security in the Euro-Atlantic area can be achieved only through co-operation and common

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<sup>8</sup> Basic Fact Sheet #1, The North Atlantic Cooperation Council, NATO Office of Information and Press, July 1994.

action. Protection and promotion of fundamental freedoms and human rights, and safeguarding freedom, justice, and peace through democracy are shared values fundamental to the Partnership.

Of course any study of documents concerning international co-operation, world peace, etc. will show only a slight deviation in ideals, stemming from the Charter of the League of Nations written in 1918. Ideals are important and certainly have their place, but they must have a practical way of being executed. In other words, how is this PFP going to make its dream come true?

As intended, the PFP is concentrating primarily on military co-operation and co-ordination. The CSCE provides for verbal and ministerial co-operation, as does the NACC, but the PFP was written to provide that missing component of physical, military, joint exercises. Since the issuing of the invitation to "the states participating in the North Atlantic Co-operation Council (NACC) and other CSCE countries able and willing to contribute to this programme (sic)..."<sup>9</sup> forty members and associate members have joined the program. Iceland, Norway, and Turkey are associate members; Ireland, Denmark and Greece are observers.<sup>10</sup> The remaining members are the 16 NATO members. The most recent of the new members of PFP came with the signing of Armenia on 5 October 1994. Of the twenty-three members of PFP that are not members of NATO, 21 were former Warsaw Pact countries; Sweden and Finland also joined the PFP rounding out the twenty-three.

The PFP is not a substitute for NATO and it does not provide specific security guarantees. "Armies of East and West may drill together...their officers may exchange once secret information...But when the security of any of the [23] junior members is threatened, the 16 full members are not obliged to take up arms and fight for their safety."<sup>11</sup> This provision is, of course, reserved for sole membership into NATO itself as provided for in Article 5 of the North

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<sup>9</sup> Basic Fact Sheet #9, Partnership for Peace, NATO Office of Information and Press, June 1994.

<sup>10</sup> "Partners for What?," 29.

<sup>11</sup> Jackson, 31.

Atlantic Treaty.<sup>12</sup> However, this is intended to be a first step that will be a proving ground for future steps to extend security to the East. Thus far, there have been three PFP joint exercises: *Exercises Co-operative Bridge*, *Co-operative Venture 94*, and *Co-operative Spirit*.

*Co-operative Bridge*, under the direction of SACEUR, included forces from 13 member countries, seven from the East. These forces exercised in Poland from 12 to 16 September focusing on co-operation among the over 600 soldiers who, not so long ago, were enemies. *Co-operative Venture 94*, under the direction of the Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (SACLANT), included the naval forces of 14 countries, four from the East, including Russia. These forces were working on naval exercises in the North Sea from 28 September to 7 October. *Co-operative Spirit*, under SACEUR, included 12 countries and over 1,000 soldiers in the Netherlands from 21 to 28 October.<sup>13</sup>

These joint military exercises were designed to provide an arena for co-operation and a way to ease post-Cold War tensions between former enemies. Detractors of NATO claim that it is "the Partnership for Peace program that help(s)... put off inevitable choices about... membership."<sup>14</sup> James Jackson, writing for Time International quotes Richard Lugar, an "expert on foreign policy, [who] dismisses the PFP as 'policy for postponement'."<sup>15</sup> This may seem the case as the Visegrad four are requesting membership in NATO as soon as possible. German Foreign Minister Volker Ruehe has urged NATO to name "prospective... members...at the December ministerial meeting and [set up] a specific timetable for expansion..."<sup>16</sup> The

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<sup>12</sup> Article V of the Treaty states: The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that... each of them... will assist the Party or Parties... by taking... such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force...

NATO Information Service, 377.

<sup>13</sup> "PFP Training gets under way," NATO Review, October 1994, 24.

<sup>14</sup> Kempe, Sec 1: 8.

<sup>15</sup> Jackson, 31.

<sup>16</sup> Kempe, Sec 1: 8.

Economist argues that "if NATO is to make genuine mutual-defence promises... it will take time to bring even the most advanced of former Warsaw Pact countries to anywhere near military standards."<sup>17</sup> This shows two sides of a multi-faceted membership question. One side reflects the desires of the East and the other reflects the requirements that NATO imposes.

That last statement, however, implies that military proficiency is the measuring rod that will be used to provide for NATO membership. When asked about criteria for membership a NATO press official stated that, there was no "firm" criteria because such a standard will be "based on an evaluation of security factors...[that will] look at modifying and restructuring the militaries of the new countries to [that of] NATO...[but such things are] difficult to measure." He concluded that "membership for NATO is not the end result of PFP."<sup>18</sup> However, at the December 1994 ministers meeting at NATO, NATO declared its intent to "define the minimum membership requirements for countries in East Europe who want to be covered by the alliance's security blanket."<sup>19</sup> From January until May, "NATO will study the costs and obligations for membership and present them to perspective members, most notably, Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic." However, in an effort not to offend Russia, the US Secretary of State Warren Christopher and other NATO ministers said, "that no recruitment of new members would take place in 1995 and even afterward, movement to expansion would take time."<sup>20</sup>

Secretary General Claes fully supports this:

Partnership for Peace is not a substitute for NATO membership. Nor was it designed to delay the moment when the Alliance should take on new members. At the January Summit, the Allies made clear they expect and would welcome enlargement. Our next task is to begin to examine internally the way ahead, so that we can prepare the Alliance to accept new members in a way that enhances European security.

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<sup>17</sup> "Partners for What?," 29.

<sup>18</sup> NATO press official, 03 Nov 94 at NATO

<sup>19</sup> Daniel Williams, "Russia Balks over NATO Expansion to the East." International Herald Tribune, 2 Dec. 1994, A: 1 & 7.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid., A:1.

PFPP is only what it claims to be. NATO is planning to expand membership, PFPP will be a factor in the determination of who and when, but NATO is examining that question independently of official PFPP involvement. As a part of PFPP membership, each country is allowed to set up an Individual Partnership Plan (IPP) where that country can officially let NATO know what it wants and what it can offer to the Alliance.

PFPP is the key to unlock membership and open a door to security, but it is not the door, nor was it intended to be.

### ***The Western European Union (WEU)***

*WEU will form an integral part of the process of the development of the European Union and will enhance its contribution to solidarity within the Atlantic Alliance... as the means to strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance.*

- Introduction from the Declaration of the member states of the  
WEU on the role of its relations with EU and the Atlantic Alliance,  
December 1991

The WEU, composed of 10 of the 12 EU member states, was revitalized in 1987 by *The Hague Platform* to "develop a more cohesive European defence identity which will translate more effectively into practice the obligations of solidarity to which we are committed through the modified Brussels and North Atlantic Treaties."<sup>21</sup> The WEU does not propose to be an independent security force, but it does advocate its strengthening in order to be a more effective element of NATO. It wants to be the "European pillar" of the North Atlantic Alliance.

At the January 1994 Brussels summit, NATO declared, "We welcome the entry into force of the Treaty of Maastricht and the launching of the European Union, which will strengthen the European pillar of the Alliance and allow it to make a more coherent contribution to the security

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<sup>21</sup> Marilou M. Righini, ed. "Platform on European Security Interests," International Legal Material 27 (1988) 270.

of all the Allies."<sup>22</sup> The WEU does not want to compete with NATO, it just allows for greater co-operation between NATO and the European Union.

There are some advocates for the plan to allow the East to hold off on direct NATO membership and enter a security agreement provided by the WEU via membership into the EU. That has the attractive point of allowing these countries to gain security outside of NATO, thus lessening the probable hostility between an expansive NATO and Russia. However, it will take much longer to prepare because in order to become a member of the WEU, they must first join the EU. Membership in the EU will not come for a while, considering that the economies of the East, as has been mentioned, are not up to the levels of the West. Furthermore, this plan would allow the East to become involved in the WEU protection, of which all current members are also members of NATO. Conceivably, this could involve the rest of NATO in a security arrangement without the vote of non-WEU members of NATO such as the US.<sup>23</sup>

The WEU is a positive component of NATO, but it is not structurally set up to handle the security of the East. Thus, it should be encouraged to strengthen within NATO and EU, but it, for the moment, is not equipped to handle the Eastern security dilemma.

### ***A New North Atlantic Treaty Organization***

NATO has many facets to examine concerning the current situation. The situations in the East have been discussed and the question of how to establish internal and external security in the East remains open. The same is true to the question of how to provide this security without offending Russia. Finally, NATO, nor any component of the Western world wants to re-freeze Cold War opposition blocs. Contrary to the belief of many, NATO still has a lot of work to do. To say that NATO has served its purpose is sheer folly. Having reached its original goal of

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<sup>22</sup> Basic Fact Sheet #3 The European Security and Defence Identity, NATO Office of Information and Press, June 1994.

<sup>23</sup> Kempe, sec. 1:8.

providing security to Europe from the Communists, NATO now has to re-define its goals and look to secure democracy and provide for the protection of human rights as defined in the Paris Charter.

NATO has done that. NATO is committed to this goal and to repeat what Secretary General Claes stated:

NATO's purpose remains what it has been from the beginning - to guarantee the security of its members, something which it has done better than any alliance in history, giving Western Europe and unprecedented period of peace and prosperity. But that is not all. Our purpose today is to equally extend these same blessings to the people of Central and Eastern Europe.

It is clear that NATO knows what it wants to do, however, it is not as clear how NATO will go about achieving success in these goals.

So far, NATO is concentrating on giving Russia assurances of its goals. Russia, since June 1994, has been a member of the PFP and as a part of PFP, Russia has diplomats and observers in Brussels and in the military center at Mons. Russia also has a special IPP in which Russia has been given a special arrangement with NATO. This IPP allows Russia to be informed about PFP and NATO activities and provide an even closer agreement between Russia and NATO. As of 3 November 1994, a NATO team was in Moscow to investigate the ways that rapport can be achieved with Russia. According to George Katsirdakis, Russian membership into NATO is not possible as it would "not be a benefit to either." However, he also insisted that NATO needs to provide Russia an equal partnership. To absolve fears that NATO is encroaching on Russia or trying to isolate Russia, Russia must be involved in these peace-keeping endeavors. The statement that Czech President Havel made, supports the idea of a genuine NATO-Russian relationship: "[An expanded NATO] would thus gradually outgrow its present role to become a genuinely pan-European security structure. But this expansion of NATO should take place against the background of a clearly defined and genuinely co-operative relationship with Russia."<sup>24</sup>

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<sup>24</sup> Havel, 6.

NATO must also be aware that it can be used to assist democracy within Russia itself. The political situation there is unstable at best. Though it is slowly improving, the economic aims of NATO and the EU can be used to help Russia, however, this must be done in a way that is not charity but is *quid pro quo*. The Russians have a strong heritage and a strong sense of pride. That must not be ignored; Russia is a Great Power and must be treated like one: with respect.

While NATO extends itself to the East to provide a security blanket there, let NATO and Russia continue to build a working co-operation. One way to further that is for NATO to take a risk and allow Russia to oversee security in its own arena. Once democracy has stabilized in Russia (a process that could take from a few to several years) let Russia extend its hand to help Asia stabilize itself. Admittedly, this is a long-range proposal that could be construed as reconstructing blocs of influence, however, the key and cornerstone is the stabilization of democracy in Russia and the close co-operation between Russia and NATO. In short, let Russia be a key, officially through the PFP as a part of NATO, between NATO and, at the same time, let Russia be a cornerstone in a new security arrangement, possibly a NPTO or EATO (North Pacific Treaty Organization or East Asian Treaty Organization). Currently, economic alliances are being solidified in this region through the Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC) and the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN). Through these economic and political ties, Russia can be included to strengthen her economic base and provide a ring of economic co-operation around the world.

The result: Russia is involved in promoting democracy beginning by absolving differences with Japan and the two join forces to promote and safeguard peace, prosperity and democracy in the Far East, the new frontier of democracy. At the same time, Russia is a link to the West and is involved in the West through NATO. If this could be worked out, Russia would not be so concerned about NATO expansion. However, the question of giving Russia permission to influence other regions is a question best reserved for another occasion.

With regard to the question of NATO expansion, let NATO slowly expand into the Visegrad four first. They are the closest within military proximity and parity, thus, soon, they can add to NATO instead of purely benefiting. By allowing them in and encouraging their growth, part of the responsibility of the East can be shared among all as the other Eastern countries stabilize. A limited security guarantee must be granted to the unstable East for a specified time to give them a chance to firmly set roots and become involved in the Western world. In other words, NATO must be willing to cover the East with this blanket to give the East a chance to catch up and re-pay the favor. A key to this, to keep it from seeming imperialistic on the part of NATO, is to incorporate available Eastern forces, with the help and sponsorship of NATO, to provide security for themselves.

For NATO, this will be a gamble on the future, but will have results in both the short-term and the long-term. If NATO incorporates membership to Visegrad countries on the two-way basis, and grants security to the East on a limited one-way basis, then peace has a greater chance; with peace comes stronger democracies and stability. In the long-term, these countries will benefit from Western aid and will strengthen to a position to be able to actively and positively contribute to the West in return.

## CHAPTER 6

### CONCLUSION

After long discourse, it surely is clear that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization has work to do. NATO has accepted that challenge and has already made clear and distinct motions that outline new goals and a new intent to extend security to Eastern Europe. The challenges that NATO faces are considerable indeed, however, the challenges that NATO faced on April 4, 1949 were likewise considerable. NATO has kept the Western world peaceful for the past forty years. NATO has helped save the earth from nuclear annihilation or a war of apocalyptic proportions. NATO won the Cold War. Now NATO needs to win the peace.

The Cold War is indeed over, but that does not mean that peace is breaking out everywhere. In fact, the post-Cold War security vacuums are ravaging the East and subsequently threatening Western democracy. The world will not stand by much longer and watch the suffering and misery going on in the East. The West wants to include the East so that the distinction between the two fades into lines found only in history books.

Many strides have been made towards this goal, but the answer has not been found. NATO has that answer within its experience. The game has changed, NATO can be instrumental in writing the new rules. NATO has accepted that challenge, and through the alleviation of old fears and a new air of co-operation the world may come one step closer to its goal: peace and prosperity for all.

Recent tests of NATO can be seen in the daily news. On 21 November 1994, "NATO warplanes bombed a Serbian airbase. However, recent changes in the US policy to NATO and Bosnia are raising serious conflicts within the organization. The conditions and outcome of this conflict will be the "make-or-break" test for NATO. NATO needs to take charge to prove to the world that it can handle such a situation in a non-Cold War way. In a recent *International*

*Herald Tribune* article, Mr. Claes was quoted as saying, "The solution for this appalling conflict can not come from this organization alone" he justified this by saying, "I have heard no head of state or prime minister ready to take the risks."<sup>1</sup>

Aside from the inability to act on this conflict, the steps towards a working relationship with Russia are not looking too productive. As late as 2 December 1994, "Russian foreign minister Andrei V. Kozyrev... objected to NATO's long-range plans to extend membership to former Soviet satellites." US State Department spokesman, Mike McCurry tried to down-play the move by saying "I would be tempted to say it was a theatrical performance meant for domestic political consumption."<sup>2</sup> Theatrical or not, it hurt the relations between Russia and NATO. It was furthered on 5 December 1994 when Russian President Boris Yeltsin opposed the NATO decision to pursue expansion when he told the 16 NATO members present at the CSCE summit in Budapest, "Why are you sowing the seeds of mistrust? ...In the aftermath of the Cold War, Europe is in danger of plunging into a Cold Peace." He concluded, "History demonstrates that it is a dangerous illusion to suppose that the destinies of continents and of the world community in general can somehow be managed from one single capital."<sup>3</sup> Thus, it seems that the fear of a US-dominated NATO is spooking Russia into mis-trust.

Russia has to be convinced that the Cold War is over and that the US is not the sole leader of NATO. This hope rests upon the eventual signing of the PFP agreement that Mr. Kozyrev rejected on 2 December 1994. If this does not work, it seems that NATO is determined to expand, especially in light of the reduced level of Russian power. Since Russia cannot, realistically, put up much resistance, NATO looks as if it will expand, regardless.

NATO has to expand, but the challenges lie in an expansion that does not result in a "Cold Peace."

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<sup>1</sup> Elaine Sciolino, "Clinton NATO Vision Leaves Yeltsin Cold," *International Herald Tribune* 6 Dec. 1994 A:1.

<sup>2</sup> Williams, A:7.

<sup>3</sup> quoted in Sciolino, A:1.

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